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Explore the Conflict and Resolution of Pollution NIMBY Facility Construction in the Context of New Media: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

机译:探讨新媒体背景下的污染尼姆比设施建设的冲突和解决:进化博弈论理论方法

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The rapid urbanization process has brought many pollution NIMBY facilities, and the associated pollution NIMBY conflicts have become one of the important factors restricting social stability. With the advent of the media era, new media has become the main channel for the public to recognize risks and master information, which greatly aggravates the social amplification effect of NIMBY conflict risk. In this case, it is of great significance to explore the interest relationship among the local government, the new media, and the local people and their roles in the NIMBY conflict. Based on the stakeholder theory, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of the local government, the new media, and the local people and carries out numerical simulation on the evolutionary model using MATLAB. The results show that the local government adopts a certain degree of regulatory strategy for the new media, the new media adopts the strategy of publicizing facts, and the local people adopts the strategy of nonresistance, which are the stable strategy points of the evolutionary game among the three stakeholders in the NIMBY conflict. The local government’s intervention in rumors to a certain extent is conducive to promoting the new media to publicize facts of the pollution NIMBY facilities and to restrain the local people’s choice of resistance strategies. The local government’s punishment to the new media spreading rumors should be kept above a certain level to restrain the new media spreading rumors. When the local people’s resistance reaches a certain level, the local government’s intervention will break down and the new media will become hyperactive. The results of this paper can provide some enlightenment for the stakeholders in pollution NIMBY conflicts and deepen the understanding of multiple interest conflicts and their resolution. Finally, this study proposes to build information sharing mechanism, information communication mechanism, trust mechanism, network governance mechanism, and public participation mechanism, so as to resolve the construction risk of pollution NIMBY facilities and improve the overall social welfare level.
机译:快速城市化进程带来了许多污染邻避设施,以及相关的污染邻避冲突已成为制约社会稳定的重要因素之一。随着媒体时代的到来,新媒体已成为公众识别风险和主信息,这大大加剧的冲突邻避风险的社会放大效应的主要渠道。在这种情况下,它是探索邻避冲突地方政府之间的利益关系,新媒体,以及当地居民和他们的角色十分重要的意义。基于利益相关者理论,本文构建了当地政府,新媒体,以及当地人民的三方演化博弈模型,并进行利用MATLAB的进化模型数值模拟。结果表明,当地政府采取了一定程度的新媒体的监管策略,新媒体,采用宣传事实的策略,和当地人民采取不抵抗的策略,这是演化博弈中稳定的战略点这三个利益相关者NIMBY冲突。当地政府在干预的传闻在一定程度上有利于促进新媒体宣传的污染NIMBY设施的事实和限制当地人民的选择性策略。当地政府的处罚,以新媒体散布谣言应保持高于一定水平来约束新媒体散布谣言。当本地人民的反抗达到一定水平,在当地政府的介入将打破和新媒体将成为异常活跃。本文的研究结果可为污染邻避冲突的利益相关者一些启示和深化多种利益冲突及其解决方案的理解。最后,这项研究提出构建信息共享机制,信息沟通机制,信任机制,网络治理机制和公众参与机制,以解决污染邻避设施的建设风险,提高整体社会福利水平。

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