Research on Bi-level Game Scheduling for Emergency Rescue Workers under the Condition of Limited Rationality

摘要

In the event of an emergency, the efficient and reasonable scheduling of emergency rescue workers in the initial stage of the emergency rescue process can considerably reduce the associated loss. In this regard, this paper proposes a bi-level game scheduling model for emergency rescue workers under the condition of limited rationality, primarily considering the demand game for limited emergency rescue workers in multiple disaster areas and the limited rational behavior of victims in the game process. Based on the proposed model, a Shuffled Frog Leaping Algorithm (SFLA) is designed to solve the problem. Finally, the rationality of the model is verified through a case study. The results indicate that the model of the emergency rescue workers scheduling (ERWS) proposed in this paper can take into account both the fairness of the scheduling while ensuring a satisfactory basic rescue effect, thereby considerably improving the satisfaction of the victims and reducing the loss resulting from the emergency. The findings can provide further emergency decision-making reference for decision-makers.