New science, old convictions ? Texas Senate Bill 344: identifying further necessary reform in forensic science

摘要

A probable factor in the quick and easy passage of SB 344 in the 2013 session was the recent Texan judicial climate and attitude toward scientific evidence. In the two years between 2011, the last time a similar bill was introduced, and 2013, appellate and district judges in Texas have penned decisions in which they cite their mistrust of forensic evidence used to convict individuals. One such opinion was issued in December 2012 in the case of Cathy Henderson, a woman who had been sentenced to death in 1994 for the capital murder of an infant, Brandon Baugh, she had been babysitting.16 In Ms Henderson's case, the state medical examiner, Dr Roberto Bayardo, re-evaluated his opinion as to the cause and manner of death based on a change in the underlying science.17 Calling for a new trial, Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Cathy Cochran wrote, ‘Changing science has cast doubt on the accuracy of the original jury verdict' and deprived Ms. Henderson of a ‘fundamentally fair trial based upon reliable scientific evidence.'18 Continuing, Judge Cochran stated, ‘This…is a case that should be retried to ensure the accuracy of our verdicts and the integrity of our system.'19Although SB 344 has enjoyed success so far, differing interpretations of the law may cause problems in the future. The law requires the courts to determine whether relevant evidence could be reasonably ascertained, scientific knowledge had changed, and the new evidence would be admissible at a trial.36 These requirements place large demands on the courts, which may not have sufficient scientific background, for implementation of the law. Furthermore, ambiguity in the language of the law may yield unintended effects. As Roe Wilson, an Assistant District Attorney in Texas, stated, ‘The bill's language concerning contested scientific evidence is overbroad as opposing experts can be found for nearly all expert testimony and evidence.'37 The language of SB 344, as is, increases the load on an already overburdened system. If an individual finds an expert that can state that the original science was faulty or debunked, then they are granted habeas relief, which in most cases would constitute new trials with the new expert's testimony. Although proponents of the law believe that it will not significantly burden the justice system, it is nearly impossible to know how quickly science may progress or how forensic evidence standards may change. Additionally, the role of SB 344 may change with broader reform of expert witness testimony. At this stage, SB 344 does not have a set interpretation, and the Texas courts will have a major role to play in deciding the impact of SB 344 on the judicial system. SB 344 itself never mentions the term ‘junk science', and only uses the term ‘scientific evidence'.38 Yet, news articles discussing SB 344 and proponents of SB 344, especially the Innocence Project, have taken to calling SB 344 the ‘Junk Science Writ'.39 This is greatly problematic and incorrectly conveys the true purpose of SB 344. Although SB 344 is aimed at providing post-conviction relief, the law will undoubtedly change the manner in which prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officials practice. Under SB 344, prosecutors may need to limit the evidence they present to more rigorously tested forms of evidence, such as DNA, and police investigators will need to alter the types of evidence they collect and tests they perform. SB 344 may lead to fewer cases being pursued if prosecutors feel that they do not have evidence that would stand the test of time. While SB 344 burdens prosecutors, it does not open the door to malpractice liability, so long as prosecutors do not negligently or intentionally present evidence they know to be debunked or invalid. In the same vein, SB 344 highlights the inherent tension between science and the law. As described by Susan Haack, there are ‘crucial differences between the legal and scientific timetables'.53 Often ‘scientific work is halting and fumbling, slowed sometimes by lack of funds or by political resistance to potentially unwelcome results, and often enough by the sheer intellectual difficulty of the question[s] concerned. And there is always, at least in principle, the possibility of having to go back and start over on questions thought to be settled. By contrast, not without reason, we want the legal system to reach its determinations within a reasonable period of time; and we want those determinations to stand once the appeals process is exhausted'.54 To do so, it is important to reconcile legal standards with standards for scientific testimony, by first creating standards for science that is first presented at trial, and standards to determine whether science is debunked or not.