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Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard

机译:道德风险下合作接力激励机制的最优合同设计

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Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks. However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetric information between the source and the relay nodes (RNs). In this paper, the relay incentive mechanism between relay nodes and the source is investigated under the asymmetric information. By modelling multiuser cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model with moral hazard for relay incentive is proposed. To effectively incentivize the potential RNs to participate in cooperative relay, the optimization problems are formulated to maximize the source’s utility while meeting the feasible conditions under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for cooperative relay.
机译:合作中继可以通过利用无线网络中的空间分集来有效地提高频谱效率。但是,无线节点可能会因各种用户的位置和移动性,信道状况以及其他因素而获得不同的网络信息,从而导致源节点与中继节点(RN)之间的信息不对称。本文研究了非对称信息下中继节点与源之间的中继激励机制。通过将多用户协作中继建模为劳动力市场,提出了具有道德风险的中继激励契约模型。为了有效地激励潜在的RN参与协作中继,提出了优化问题,以在满足对称和不对称信息场景下的可行条件的同时,最大化源的效用。数值仿真结果证明了所提出的合作继电器合同设计方案的有效性。

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