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Differential Game Analyses of Logistics Service Supply Chain Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

机译:成本分担契约的物流服务供应链协调差异化博弈分析。

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Cooperation of all the members in a supply chain plays an important role in logistics service. The service integrator can encourage cooperation from service suppliers by sharing their cost during the service, which we assume can increase the sales by accumulating the reputation of the supply chain. A differential game model is established with the logistics service supply chain that consists of one service integrator and one supplier. And we derive the optimal solutions of the Nash equilibrium without cost sharing contract and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the integrator as the leader who partially shares the cost of the efforts of the supplier. The results make the benefits of the cost sharing contract in increasing the profits of both players as well as the whole supply chain explicit, which means that the cost sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism in the long-term relationship of the members in a logistics service supply chain.
机译:供应链中所有成员的合作在物流服务中起着重要作用。服务集成商可以通过在服务期间分摊成本来鼓励服务提供商的合作,我们认为这可以通过积累供应链的声誉来增加销售量。建立了由一个服务集成商和一个供应商组成的物流服务供应链的差分博弈模型。并且我们推导了无成本分摊合同的纳什均衡和Stackelberg均衡的最优解,其中集成商为领导者,后者部分分担供应商的工作成本。结果使成本分摊合同在增加双方参与者和整个供应链的利润方面的优势变得明显,这意味着成本分摊合同是物流中成员之间长期关系的有效协调机制服务供应链。

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