Pricing-Decision and Coordination Contract considering Product Design and Quality of Recovery Product in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

摘要

In a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper studies the pricing strategies and coordination mechanism of supply chain when the remanufacturing cost is random caused by the proportion of reusability parts in design stage and quality condition of recycling product. The results show that the wholesale price and retail price are negative correlation, while the recycling rate and total profit of supply chain system are positive correlation with the proportion of reusability component designed in new product and quality of recycling product. Moreover, there are conclusions that the wholesale price and retail price are lower while the recycling rate and total profit of supply chain system are higher with centralized decision. Then, in order to coordinate the closed-loopsupply chain, this paper develops a revenue-sharing contract, in which the revenue share parameter is determined based on absolute deviation approach. The theoretical results are illustrated by a numerical example.