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Board of Directors, Management Ownership, and Capital Structure and Its Effect on Performance: The Case of Palestine Securities Exchange

机译:董事会,管理层所有制,资本结构及其对绩效的影响:以巴勒斯坦证券交易所为例

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This manuscript offers an empirical investigation of three variables that have an effect on the financial performance of the corporations listed in the Palestine Securities Exchange (PSE). The three variables are aboard of directors’ characteristics (size and composition), b- management ownership, and c- capital structure. Furthermore, this paper uses the same methodology as (Belkhir, 2009; Pesamaa, Klaesson, and Haahti, 2008; Ghosh, 2003; Dowen, 1995). It employs various statistical techniques to examine the hypotheses (descriptive analysis, and ordinary least square; simple and multiple regression). Besides, 28 Palestinian corporations were selected for applying statistical analysis within four years 2005-2008. The results of the study indicate that the Chief Executive Officer CEO-Chairman separation does not have any significant impact while the CEO-Chairman duality has a significant impact on the financial performance. Additionally, the paper finds out that the board size has a significant negative impact on the financial performance. In addition, this paper concludes a positive impact of management ownership on the financial performance. Finally, we conclude that the debt financing has no influence on the profitability of Palestinian corporations. Therefore, we recommend the Palestinian legislator to consider the findings of our paper when he decides to publish the Palestinian company act. In the end, we hope that the Palestinian legislator to take in consideration the current model of Daraghma and Alsinawi study when he issues the new Palestinian company law.
机译:该手稿对三个变量进行了实证研究,这些变量对在巴勒斯坦证券交易所(PSE)上市的公司的财务业绩有影响。这三个变量是董事的特征(规模和组成),b-管理层所有权和c-资本结构。此外,本文使用与(Belkhir,2009; Pesamaa,Klaesson和Haahti,2008; Ghosh,2003; Dowen,1995)相同的方法。它采用各种统计技术来检验假设(描述性分析和普通最小二乘法;简单多元回归)。此外,还选择了28家巴勒斯坦公司在2005-2008年的四年内进行统计分析。研究结果表明,首席执行官兼首席执行官与董事长的分离不会产生任何重大影响,而首席执行官兼董事长的双重性则对财务绩效产生重大影响。此外,该文件还发现,董事会规模对财务绩效有重大负面影响。此外,本文总结了管理层所有权对财务绩效的积极影响。最后,我们得出结论,债务融资对巴勒斯坦公司的盈利能力没有影响。因此,我们建议巴勒斯坦立法者在决定发表《巴勒斯坦公司法》时考虑我们文件的结论。最后,我们希望巴勒斯坦立法者在颁布新的巴勒斯坦公司法时考虑到目前的达拉格马和阿尔西纳维研究模式。

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