首页> 外文期刊>African Journal of Business Management >The effect of ultimate owner and regulation policy on corporate social responsibility information disclosure: Evidence from China
【24h】

The effect of ultimate owner and regulation policy on corporate social responsibility information disclosure: Evidence from China

机译:最终所有者和监管政策对企业社会责任信息披露的影响:来自中国的证据

获取原文
           

摘要

In the process of economic development, how to achieve the goal of harmonious development between society and companies is an important issue for the government. In China, the government ultimately owns more than half of the listed companies. Thus, the government plays a critical role in firms’ disclosure of social responsibility information. Although, the Chinese government enacted such disclosure policies in 2006, there are some slight differences in the details between the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. It provides us with a unique context to test the effectiveness of explicit regulation policy. Thus, this paper investigated the impact of ultimate owner and regulation policy on the social responsibility reporting of publicly listed companies. Using the sample of 446 listed companies that disclosed the social responsibility and ultimate owner information in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, this paper found that firms under the two stock exchanges do report differently on social responsibility. Besides, compared with voluntary disclosure firms, those under mandatory disclosure requirements do provide more social responsibility information. In addition, it was found that state ownership and voting rights have a positive effect on the disclosure of social responsibility information.
机译:在经济发展的过程中,如何实现社会与企业和谐发展的目标是政府的重要课题。在中国,政府最终拥有超过一半的上市公司。因此,政府在企业披露社会责任信息中起着至关重要的作用。尽管中国政府于2006年颁布了此类披露政策,但深圳证券交易所和上海证券交易所在细节上仍存在一些细微差异。它为我们提供了一个独特的环境来测试明确监管政策的有效性。因此,本文研究了最终所有者和监管政策对上市公司社会责任报告的影响。本文使用446家在上海和深圳证券交易所披露了社会责任和最终所有者信息的上市公司的样本,发现两个证券交易所下的公司的社会责任报告确实有所不同。此外,与自愿披露公司相比,那些具有强制披露要求的公司确实提供了更多的社会责任信息。此外,发现国家所有权和投票权对社会责任信息的披露具有积极影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号