Fighting in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Soviet Intervention, 1979-89

摘要

Through their experience in Afghanistan the Soviet armed forces developed operational and tactical procedures already employed by Western armies due to experience in such places as Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, Oman and others. They made significant changes in the way their forces were trained and equipped and they began to enjoy much greater levels of success against their enemy. However, in the end, the second most powerful nation in the world was forced, as had every invading nation in Afghanistan prior to the Soviets, to withdraw in the end. In the Soviets' case, their goal of shoring up the DRA regime failed and the Taliban eventually emerged from the chaos left behind. It is too late to think whether or not the US and the West should have intervened in Afghanistan, as they have already done so. The really difficult questions still have to be faced: what will the Allies accept as victory conditions? Based on what we know of the Soviet experience, how can they consolidate victory and avoid getting bogged down in an Afghanistan quagmire? How can they shore up the regime that has been installed and keep it from fracturing as so many regimes have in the past? It should be remembered that this kind of fracturing is exactly the kind of precursor that led to Taliban. Will this include support for counter-insurgency against Taliban and Al Quaeda remnants? What kind of nation-building social, economic and political commitments are the Allies prepared to make to help Afghanistan prevent a repeat of the conditions that led to the current campaign? This article does not pretend to have answers to these questions, but does argue that in seeking answers the Allies should pay close attention to the Soviet experience. It could save them from going through some of the same hell.