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Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy

机译:搭便车还是克制?审查欧洲大战略

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The major U.S. allies seem to be content to let the United States shoulder the burden associated with assuring the security of the West and promoting freedom and democracy around the world, passively free riding on the security provided by the U.S. taxpayer. A different explanation is available, if rarely discussed: Perhaps the Europeans great powers are not merely passive consumers of free U.S. security guarantees; perhaps instead the decisions they have made with regard to their own defense are part of active, coherent, logical, rational grand strategies. Perhaps the choice to pursue strategic restraint is not due to the stability provided by U.S. hegemony but a conscious response to declining threat. This article seeks to explain the grand strategies of some of the great and potentially great powers of the post-Cold War world. Far from being irresponsible international actors, our allies are acting quite rationally in a world virtually absent of serious threat, at least compared to all those that have come before.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.605020
机译:美国主要盟国似乎很满足于让美国承担与确保西方安全,在世界范围内促进自由与民主有关的负担,被动地搭便车去享受美国纳税人提供的安全。如果很少讨论,则有不同的解释:也许欧洲大国不仅是美国免费安全保证的消极消费者,而且还只是欧洲的大国。也许相反,他们关于自己的防御所做的决定是积极,连贯,合乎逻辑,理性的大战略的一部分。追求战略克制的选择也许不是由于美国霸权提供的稳定性,而是对不断下降的威胁的有意识的反应。本文力图解释冷战后世界中某些强大国家和潜在强大国家的宏伟战略。我们的盟友绝不是不负责任的国际行为者,而是在几乎没有受到严重威胁的世界中采取合理的行动,至少与以前的所有行动者相比。查看全文下载全文相关的var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线” ,services_compact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,美味,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布号:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2011.605020

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