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Why did monetary policymakers fail to stem the Great Depression of the 1930s? A conventional view, largely due to Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs (1986) and Ben Bernanke (2004), holds that the gold standard was key. Adherence to the gold standard forced economies experiencing capital outflows to contract and was the key mechanism by which deflation was spread throughout the world. The link to gold also prevented central banks from acting as the lender of last resort when faced with a financial panic, and it placed constraints on fiscal authorities who might otherwise have engaged in expansionary spending or tax policies. A key stylized fact that supports this interpretation is that among the industrialized countries, the depth and length of the depression were correlated with how long a country stayed on the gold standard. The downturn was more muted in countries, such as the United Kingdom, that were among the first to exit the gold standard, and longer in countries, such as France, that were among the last.
机译:为什么货币政策制定者不能阻止1930年代的大萧条?传统观点认为,金本位制是关键,这在很大程度上归功于Barry Eichengreen和Jeffrey Sachs(1986)和Ben Bernanke(2004)。坚持金本位制迫使经济体经历资本外流收缩,这是通货紧缩在全球蔓延的关键机制。与黄金的联系还阻止了央行在面对金融恐慌时充当最后的贷方,并且对可能参与扩张性支出或税收政策的财政当局施加了限制。支持这种解释的一个典型的程式化事实是,在工业化国家中,萧条的深度和持续时间与一个国家在黄金标准上停留了多长时间相关。在英国等最早退出金本位制的国家中,经济下滑的程度更为缓和,而在法国等最后一个退出金本位制的国家中,这种下滑时间更长。

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