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Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies under the Issuer Pay Model Through a Mandatory Compensation Competition

机译:通过强制性薪酬竞争激励发行人薪酬模型下的信用评级机构

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摘要

Credit rating agencies suffer from a lack of competition and will to perform better than other agencies, which diminishes the quality of credit ratings. If competition in fact does not exist, regulation should induce it. Large numbers of competitors are not needed to achieve robust, positive competition. Contrary to accepted wisdom, an industry of three firms can be competitive under the right conditions. The condition for competition is created when a portion of compensation is redirected from consideration for services rendered to pay for performance. A mandatory winner-take-all bonus scheme can augment the issuer-pay model. This modest, at-the-margin change can create the necessary conditions for robust, positive competition.
机译:信用评级机构缺乏竞争,并且会比其他机构表现更好,这降低了信用评级的质量。如果实际上不存在竞争,则应通过监管来引发竞争。不需要大量竞争者即可实现强劲积极的竞争。与公认的观点相反,由三个公司组成的行业在适当的条件下可以具有竞争力。当补偿的一部分从考虑提供的服务转向支付性能时,便创建了竞争条件。强制性的赢家通吃奖金计划可以扩大发行人付款模式。这种适度的利润变化可以为稳健,积极的竞争创造必要的条件。

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  • 来源
    《Banking & Financial Services Policy Report》 |2014年第4期|11-20|共10页
  • 作者

    Robert J. Rhee;

  • 作者单位

    University of Florida Levin Collegeof Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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