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The state as a regulator of business ethics in Edo Japan: the Tokugawa authority structure and private interests

机译:在江户日本作为商业道德监管者的国家:德川的权力结构和私人利益

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摘要

Throughout human history, institutions have remained very resilient. However, as this study finds, political institutions have been far more persistent than economic institutions or modes of exchange. From various sources, we can discern that economic institutions have adopted four different modes (manorial, market, entrepreneurial and mercantile) interchangeably without any predetermined sequence. Whereas the big ideas of capitalism, socialism or social democracy were not influential in institutionalizing stable economic institutions, business interests that affected the microeconomic decisions (or state interventions in the private sector) frequently changed the malleable economic institutions. Contrary to the stable political institutions, business ethics qua institutional ideas therefore changed frequently to justify one mode of exchange over another. As we find in this contribution, Japanese ethical discourses during the Edo period intended to justify individual and group interests within the realm of the state apparatus that resulted in changes in the economic institutions. Based on public archives on economic policies during the Edo period, we find that the central and local governments routinely or even whimsically changed their economic policies along the four modes exchange that John Lie proposed two decades ago. Whenever state policies were changed from one mode of exchange to another, they came with justifiable ethical support. Business ethics was therefore subsumed under business interests.
机译:在整个人类历史上,机构一直保持着非常强的韧性。但是,正如本研究发现的那样,政治制度比经济制度或交换方式要持久得多。从各种来源,我们可以看出,经济机构已经以四种不同模式(庄园,市场,企业家和商业)交替使用而没有任何预定的顺序。尽管资本主义,社会主义或社会民主主义的大思想对稳定经济体制的制度化没有影响,但影响微观经济决策(或国家对私营部门的干预)的商业利益却常常改变了具有延展性的经济体制。因此,与稳定的政治制度相反,商业道德和制度观念经常发生变化,以证明一种交换方式是合理的。正如我们在此贡献中所发现的那样,江户时代的日本道德话语旨在证明导致经济制度发生变化的国家机构领域内的个人和团体利益合理。根据江户时代有关经济政策的公共档案,我们发现中央和地方政府按照约翰·李在20年前提出的四种交换方式,例行甚至异想天开地改变了经济政策。只要国家政策从一种交换方式改变为另一种交换方式,它们就会得到合理的道德支持。因此,商业道德被归入商业利益之内。

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