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The medical doctors as gatekeepers in the sickness insurance?

机译:作为疾病保险看门人的医生?

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Based on a randomized experiment, we estimate effects from notification to medical doctors of tighter monitoring of their Medical Certificates (MCs). Both the time prescribed by the doctor certificates for sick leave (prescribed sick leave) and the impact on the length of the actual sickness absence (actual sick leave) is studied. We find no effect on the total number of prescribed sick leave days. However, we do find an increase in both prescribed and actual sick leave with a 25% work inability. We also find that the notification letter causes an increase in actual sick leave (i.e. the number of reimbursed sick days). We discuss a number of potential explanations for this rather surprising result.View full textDownload full textKeywordsmonitoring, moral hazard, public social insuranceJEL Classification:C93, H51, H55, J22Related var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2011.579064
机译:基于随机实验,我们估计从通知医生开始对其医疗证书(MCs)进行更严格监控的效果。既要研究医生证明病假的时间(规定的病假),又要考虑实际缺勤时间的长短(实际病假)。我们发现对规定的病假天总数没有影响。但是,我们确实发现规定病假和实际病假都有所增加,无工作能力的比例提高了25%。我们还发现,通知书会导致实际病假(即已报销的病假天数)增加。我们讨论了这个令人惊讶的结果的许多可能的解释。查看全文下载全文关键字监视,道德风险,公共社会保险JEL分类:C93,H51,H55,J22相关变量var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”,servicescompact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,美味,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2011.579064

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