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Family ownership, altruism and agency costs in Australian small- and medium-sized enterprises

机译:澳大利亚中小企业的家庭所有权,利他主义和代理成本

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摘要

Given the continuing uncertainty about whether family firms enjoy lower agency costs, this article hypothesizes that a combination of the effects of family ownership, altruism and self-control is instead at play. To begin with, family ownership can indeed reduce agency costs through better aligning the interests of owners and managers. This is a 'determining' effect in that it independently mitigates one source of agency problems. However, altruism combined with self-control problems arising from the highly concentrated ownership often found in family firms can also increase agency costs. This is an 'embedding' effect as it is rooted in the personal relationships within the family firm. Using the Business Longitudinal Database compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find that for larger SMEs (those with 20-200 employees), the gains in lower agency costs arising from family ownership are almost completely offset by the losses from altruism and the lack of self-control.
机译:鉴于家族企业是否享有较低的代理成本的持续不确定性,本文假设家族所有权,利他主义和自我控制的综合作用正在发挥作用。首先,家族所有权确实可以通过更好地协调所有者和管理者的利益来降低代理成本。这是一种“确定性”效果,因为它可以独立缓解代理问题的一个根源。但是,利他主义与家族企业中经常出现的高度集中所有权引起的自我控制问题相结合,也会增加代理成本。这是“嵌入”效应,因为它根植于家族企业内部的个人关系。使用澳大利亚统计局针对中小型企业(SME)编制的企业纵向数据库,我们发现,对于大型SME(拥有20-200名员工的中小企业)来说,家庭拥有权所产生的代理成本降低的收益为几乎完全被利他主义的损失和缺乏自我控制所抵消。

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