Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content By Neil Feit

摘要

In this short, clear and engaging book, Neil Feit defends the unorthodox view that thencontents of beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are properties, and not, as is usuallynheld, propositions. The core of his argument has to do with de se beliefs, beliefs about the self. Based on examples and arguments due to Perry (1979), Lewis (1979) andnChisholm (1981), along with considerations about internalism and physicalism, Feitnoffers a battery of arguments for the conclusion that the contents of de se beliefsncannot be propositions and therefore must be properties. For reasons of uniformitynand simplicity Feit then extends this conclusion to all beliefs. So, according to Feit, thencontent of the de se belief that I am a philosopher is the property of being a philosopher,nand my having this belief consists in my self-ascribing this property. For de dictonbeliefs, believing that p is self-ascribing the property of being such that p, and for de renbeliefs, believing that x is F is (roughly) self-ascribing the property of bearing somenrelation of acquaintance R to something that is F. For example, to have the de dictonbelief that all men are mortal is to self-ascribe the property of being such that all mennare mortal. To have the de re belief that Socrates is mortal is to bear some relation ofnacquaintance R uniquely to Socrates, and to self-ascribe the property of bearing R tonsomething that is mortal.