Virtue Epistemology: Motivation and Knowledge

摘要

A distinctive feature of virtue epistemology is the contention that an agent’s knowl-nedge is explained on the basis of the agent’s epistemic character traits. Virtue episte-nmologists are usually divided into two groups: virtue reliabilists who take thenepistemic virtues to centre on basic cognitive faculties such as perception andnmemory, and virtue responsibilists who believe that the important epistemic virtuesninclude more robust character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual cour-nage. In this volume, Stephen Napier argues that virtue responsibilism is superior tonvirtue reliabilism (and other theories of knowledge). He takes the primary competitornto his position to be the reliabilism of Alvin Goldman (whom he classifies as a virtue reliabilist), and he aligns his own view with the virtue responsibilism of LindanZagzebski.