Bernhard Irrgang: Critics of technological lifeworld, collection of philosophical essays

摘要

Ever since Husserl's phenomenology replaced Naturalism in looking at human relation to the material world with "Life-world", the role played by the human subjectivity has been seen by Philosophy as not that just of a scientifically astute observer engaging with an object with clearly pre-defined contours, but that of a constitutive one, where he with his "embodied" status is equally actively involved as the object itself in defining his experience in relation to the objects around him, constituting thereby his life-world. Heidegger goes then a step further and invests the term with further ontological dimensions, in that Being is ultimately not a given pre-determined entity or experience, rather a consistently worked upon structure of openness in the world, where language and technics form the basic framework that constitutes the hermeneutic and phenome-nological foundation and therewith a certain historicity of Being. In its historicity, Being, technics and language are a work of erasure, as all three mutually constitute each other and together re-define themselves or are forced to do by the sheer force and breadth of their dynamics. "Embodiment" has since then been a key concept to understanding technics in the context of human experience with it. The expansion of Being has hence been the expansion of technics and vice versa, at least phenomenologically. It is the task of philosophy to hermeneutically catch up with this expansion and lay out for others the ultimate meaning of this and to use the Heideggerian term "ontico-ontologi-cally" work out the sense of our Being, which is ultimately also a "technical" one.