首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>PLoS Clinical Trials >Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners' Dilemma
【2h】

Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners' Dilemma

机译:一站式高风险电视囚徒困境中的合作关系

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。

摘要

Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners' dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners' dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when “playing” for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected.
机译:解释非亲戚之间的合作对于进化生物学和社会科学都是一个难题。在人类中,通常是在实验室环境中使用诸如囚徒困境之类的经济游戏来研究合作。但是,此类实验有时会因低赌注和虚假的学生样本而被批评。金球奖是一个电视游戏节目,它利用囚犯的困境,参与者众多,经常玩很大的赌注。我们使用这个非实验数据集来调查当“玩”比经济实验中发现的更大的赌注时影响合作的因素。游戏节目具有较早的阶段,可以分析撒谎和投票决定。我们发现,参赛者对所涉及的赌注非常敏感,而在绝对和相对赌注中,当赌注都更大时,合作就会减少。我们还发现,较年长的参赛者更有可能合作,撒谎者的合作行为较少,但前提是他们说谎时要撒谎,并且身体接触与合作减少有关,而笑声和诺言则是可靠的信号或暗示。合作,但未必能被发现。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
代理获取

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号