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The new bundled payment program for joint replacement may unfairly penalize hospitals that treat patients with medical comorbidities

机译:新的联合置换捆绑付款计划可能不公平地惩罚治疗患有合并症的医院

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摘要

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently implemented the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model. While many stakeholders are enthusiastic that the program will reduce spending for joint replacement, others are concerned that the program will unintentionally penalize hospitals that treat medically complex patients. This concern stems from the fact that the program may not include a mechanism to sufficiently account for patient complexity (i.e., risk adjustment). Using Medicare claims, we examined this concern and found an inverse association between patient complexity and year-end bonuses (i.e., reconciliation payments). Specifically, reconciliation payments were reduced by $827 per episode for each standard deviation increase in a hospital’s patient complexity (p<0.01). Moreover, we found that risk adjustment could increase reconciliation payments to some hospitals by as much as $114,184 annually. Our findings suggest that CMS should include risk adjustment in the CJR model and future bundled payment programs.
机译:医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心(CMS)最近实施了关节置换综合护理(CJR)模式。尽管许多利益相关者都热衷于该计划将减少关节置换的支出,但其他人则担心该计划将无意中惩罚治疗医学上复杂患者的医院。该担心源自以下事实:该程序可能不包括足以说明患者复杂性的机制(即风险调整)。通过使用Medicare索赔,我们检查了这种担忧,并发现患者复杂性与年终奖金(即和解付款)之间存在反比关系。具体来说,医院患者复杂度每增加标准差,对账单价每集减少827美元(p <0.01)。此外,我们发现风险调整可以使对某些医院的和解付款每年增加多达114,184美元。我们的发现表明,CMS应该在CJR模型和将来的捆绑付款程序中包括风险调整。

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