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Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity

机译:经济损失中的随机性增加了间接互惠中的声誉价值

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摘要

Recent theory predicts harsh and stochastic conditions to generally promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we test experimentally whether stochasticity in economic losses also affects the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity, a type of cooperation that is very typical for humans. We used a repeated helping game with observers. One subject (the “Unlucky”) lost some money, another one (the “Passer-by”) could reduce this loss by accepting a cost to herself, thereby building up a reputation that could be used by others in later interactions. The losses were either stable or stochastic, but the average loss over time and the average efficiency gains of helping were kept constant in both treatments. We found that players with a reputation of being generous were generally more likely to receive help by others, such that investing into a good reputation generated long-term benefits that compensated for the immediate costs of helping. Helping frequencies were similar in both treatments, but players with a reputation to be selfish lost more resources under stochastic conditions. Hence, returns on investment were steeper when losses varied than when they did not. We conclude that this type of stochasticity increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.
机译:最近的理论预测,苛刻和随机条件将总体上促进合作的发展。在这里,我们通过实验测试经济损失中的随机性是否也会影响间接互惠中的声誉价值,间接互惠是人类非常典型的一种合作类型。我们与观察者反复使用了帮助游戏。一个主题(“不幸”)损失了一些钱,另一个主题(“路人”)可以通过承担自己的成本来减少这种损失,从而建立声誉,供其他人在以后的互动中使用。损失要么是稳定的,要么是随机的,但是在两种治疗中,随时间的平均损失和帮助的平均效率收益保持恒定。我们发现,拥有慷慨声誉的玩家通常更容易获得他人的帮助,因此,对声誉良好的玩家进行投资会产生长期利益,从而弥补了即时帮助成本。两种治疗的帮助频率相似,但是以自私自利的玩家在随机条件下会损失更多资源。因此,当损失变化时,投资收益比没有变化时更为陡峭。我们得出结论,这种随机性增加了间接互惠中的声誉价值。

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