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What makes us conscious of our own agency? And why the conscious versus unconscious representation distinction matters

机译:是什么使我们意识到自己的代理机构?以及为什么有意识的和无意识的表征区别很重要

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摘要

Existing accounts of the sense of agency tend to focus on the proximal causal history of the feeling. That is, they explain the sense of agency by describing the cognitive mechanism that causes the sense of agency to be elicited. However, it is possible to elicit an unconscious representation of one’s own agency that plays a different role in a cognitive system. I use the “occasionality problem” to suggest that taking this distinction seriously has potential theoretical pay-offs for this reason. We are faced, then, with a need to distinguish instances of the representation of one’s own agency in which the subject is aware of their sense of own agency from instances in which they are not. This corresponds to a specific instance of what Dennett calls the “Hard Question”: once the representation is elicited, then what happens? In other words, how is a representation of one’s own agency used in a cognitive system when the subject is aware of it? How is this different from when the representation of own agency remains unconscious? This phrasing suggests a Functionalist answer to the Hard Question. I consider two single function hypotheses. First, perhaps the representation of own agency enters into the mechanisms of attention. This seems unlikely as, in general, attention is insufficient for awareness. Second, perhaps, a subject is aware of their sense of agency when it is available for verbal report. However, this seems inconsistent with evidence of a sense of agency in the great apes. Although these two single function views seem like dead ends, multifunction hypotheses such as the global workspace theory remain live options which we should consider. I close by considering a non-functionalist answer to the Hard Question: perhaps it is not a difference in the use to which the representation is put, but a difference in the nature of the representation itself. When it comes to the sense of agency, the Hard Question remains, but there are alternatives open to us.
机译:现有的代理感说明倾向于集中在感觉的近端因果历史上。就是说,他们通过描述引起代理感的认知机制来解释代理感。但是,有可能在自己的代理机构中潜移默化地表现出自己的代理机构,该代理机构在认知系统中扮演着不同的角色。我用“偶然性问题”来表示,正因为如此,认真对待这一区分具有潜在的理论回报。因此,我们面临着需要区分主体知道自己对自己的代理的感觉的个体代理的代表实例和主体没有意识到自己的代理的感觉的实例。这对应于Dennett所谓的“难题”的特定实例:一旦提出表示,那么会发生什么?换句话说,当受试者意识到这一点时,如何在认知系统中使用自己的代理机构的表示呢?这与本人代理机构的代表仍然无意识的情况有何不同?此措辞建议功能主义者回答“难题”。我考虑了两个单功能假设。首先,也许自己代理的代表进入了注意机制。通常来说,这似乎不太可能,因为注意力不足以提高认识。第二,也许,当一个对象可以进行口头报告时,他们就会意识到他们的代理意识。但是,这似乎与大猩猩的代理意识不符。尽管这两个单一功能视图似乎是死胡同,但诸如全局工作区理论之类的多功能假设仍然是我们应该考虑的实时选择。最后,我考虑了一个非功能主义者对难题的回答:也许这不是表示所使用的用途上的差异,而是表示本身的性质上的差异。关于代理意识,困难的问题仍然存在,但是我们还有其他选择。

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