基于企业效率和负外部性差异的低碳交通部门碳税与补贴政策设计

摘要

To analyze how the differences of efficiency and negative externalities between two firms affect carbon taxes and subsi-dies in low carbon transport sector, we build a two-stage game model involved the government and duopoly transportation manufacturers under stable government estimate. The results show:when the development cost of low carbon technology keeps decreasing, the optimal level of carbon taxes from the government to traditional high carbon transport sector keeps increasing while optimal level of subsidies to manufacturing enterprises of low carbon discharge technology firstly increases and then decreases, showing an inversely U-shaped rela-tionship;compared with free markets, the government involvement in market regulation solves market failure and improves the level of social welfare. Finally, we shall properly allocate carbon taxes and subsidies regulation policies in accordance with the development level of low carbon technology.%在政府预算平衡条件下，构建包含政府和双寡头交通工具生产商的两阶段博弈模型，分析了企业间效率差异以及负外部性差异对低碳交通领域政府碳税和补贴规制设计的影响。结果表明，随着低碳技术开发成本的不断降低，政府对传统高碳交通企业的最优碳税强度不断增大，而对低碳排放技术生产企业的最优补贴强度先提高后降低，成倒U型关系。政府参与市场规制是解决市场失灵、提高社会福利水平有效途径，但应根据低碳技术发展水平合理配置碳税与补贴两种规制政策。