不完全信息条件下企业并购行为研究

摘要

Enterprise mergers and acquisitions, as a kind of property rights transaction activity, have always been closely watched. At first, this paper generalizes the theory of mergers and acquisitions, and then, from the non-complete information dynamic game point of view, puts forward a series of assumptions. The paper carries on a game analysis of the decisions of the agent and the actor of this activity. Finally, is the paper concludes that in the signaling game, only separating equilibrium is the best and most efficient equilibrium. And to perfect and norma-tive the m&a market environment in China, the paper puts forward some suggestions.%企业并购作为一种产权交易活动,历来备受关注.本文首先对企业并购理论进行了梳理,然后从不完全信息动态博弈的角度提出了一系列的前提假设,对并购企业和被并购企业的决策进行了博弈分析,最后得出在企业并购信号传递博弈中,只有分离均衡才是最优及最有效率的均衡,并为完善与规范我国并购市场环境提出了一些建议.