我国低碳消费经济补偿政策的委托-代理问题

摘要

低碳消费是社会兼顾经济效率和减排效率的关键节点，但低碳消费启动困难已成共识。在众多启动措施中，激励性规制是启动低碳消费的最直接杠杆，据此规制思想，我国设计了“节能惠民工程”消费直补政策，经运行4年，能效水平成为影响家电消费行为的重要因素，节能意识深入社会心理，但“骗补”行为的存在对低碳消费、政府管理和企业声誉均产生消极影响。经过Jean－Jacques Laffont 和David Martimort委托—代理模型验证，在由政府、家电厂商和家电消费者三方缔结而成的激励规制合约中，家电厂商在销量、产品节能水平甚至定价上存在隐蔽行为，降低了政策效应。政府需要通过增加监督惩罚机制设计和强化节能能力管理的优化方法来规避规制合约中的逆向选择问题。%Low-carbon consumption is the key to economic efficiency and emissions reduction .But the diffi-culty to develop it is a common understanding .Among the other measures , incentive regulation can do it di-rectly.The“energy-saving and people-benefit project”, which has been practiced for four years , is made as one direct consumption subsidy policy .As results, energy efficiency indicator becomes the important factor to household appliances consumer behavior , and the awareness of energy conservation goes? deeply? into social psychology .But “exaggerating the amount of subsidy” creates large negative impact on low-carbon consumption , government and enterprises .Being tested by Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort ’ s principal-agent model , it shows that in the incentive regulation contract of government , enterprises and con-sumers, enterprises’ actual sales, energy efficiency, price were hidden, which weakened the effect of the policy .The solution is to evade the reverse option in the contract by optimizing the monitoring and punish-ment mechanism and the energy-saving management .