This paper studies the dynamic pricing strategies in the presence of strategic consumer behavior risks. On the one hand, the monopolistic firm sells a fixed capacity of perishable goods within a limited time when the demand is uncertain, in the hope of maximizing expected revenue at a certain risk; On the other hand, strategic consumers set the chance of purchase on the basis of reference prices in the dynamic pricing. We find that: the game-perfect equilibrium is existent between the behavior strategies of monopolists and those of consumers; within the scope of balanced price, strategic purchase behavior changes the payments or payoffs among transaction counterparties and increases the uncertainty of firm' s profits. As a response, the risk-sensitive firm tends to price conservatively and they realize the set goal of price with trading information transparency as the guide.%本文研究的是存在战略消费者行为风险的动态定价问题,垄断厂商在需求不确定的有限时间内销售定量易逝商品,追求既定风险下的期望收益最大化;战略消费者在动态定价下基于参考价格安排购买时机.研究表明,厂商和消费者的行为策略间存在完美博弈均衡;在均衡价格范围内,战略购买行为改变了各交易主体的收益或支付,扩大了厂商收益不确定性风险;风险敏感的厂商定价趋于保守;交易信息透明是厂商实现预定目标的引导条件.
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