由专车新规看经济活动中政府的缺位与越位∗--一个市场管制与寻租的理论模型

摘要

The role of government in economy is to rectify the market failure,but rent-seeking and captured government are one of the most obvious characteristics of so called government failure.In this article,using the basic methods of game theory,we prove that the measures to overcome the rent-seeking problems,such as the more severe to punish the rent-seeker,enhancing the rewards to the regulator,more severe to punish the default regulator,will only achieve the effect in short term.In the long run,it won’t go out of the rent-seeking-regulation dilemma.Then we come to the conclusion that government intervene is the source and necessary condition of rent-seeking behavior,so what we are to do is to eliminate the government power to intervene the economy and relax regulation.%近期出台的专车新规实际上是政府在经济活动中能否真正发挥更好作用的一个缩影。政府干预市场活动主要是为了纠正市场失灵，但寻租与“被俘获的政府”是“政府失灵”最主要的表现之一。文章通过构建一个静态混合博弈模型，说明针对市场中的经济人寻租采取加大惩罚寻租措施、奖励监管者和加大失职监管者惩罚力度等措施，都仅在短期有效而长期仍会陷入管制与寻租困境。政府干预市场力量的存在是经济寻租行为的必要条件，因而最大限度放松政府对市场的管制与干预是解决问题的关键，这样才能真正建立让市场在资源配置中起决定性作用的制度环境。本文为理解政府如何在诸如专车等新兴行业和市场经济中的作用，提供了有益的理论分析框架。