公司治理环境、资产配置偏好与利益侵占

摘要

本文从资产结构视角将大股东资金侵占与投资行为问题纳入统一的分析框架进行研究.通过构建一个理论模型分析表明,外部治理环境越好、大股东持股比例越大降低了大股东流动资产侵占的比例；投资水平、投资收益率越大抑制了大股东侵占流动资产的动机.实证检验结果显示,投资水平、固定资产投资收益率、第一大持股比例与流动资产侵占呈现显著负相关关系；外部治理环境与流动资产侵占呈现呈现正相关关系,但回归结果不显著.本文为大股东利益侵占行为的研究提供了新的研究视角,有助于未来进一步深入探讨大股东代理问题.%A growing number of studies has shown that although corporations with controlling shareholders can solve the traditional corporate governance problem they will face new principal-agent problems. When ownership and control are separated in the modern corporation, the controlling shareholder has a motive to take other shareholders' interest for himself. Past studies emphasize on diverting cash in related party transactions and capital allocation based on private benefit control. Do they have some relationships? This paper mainly explores the difference in the controlling shareholder's asset allocation behaviors for the private benefit of control and expects to offer a new perspective for the controlling shareholder's agent problem.rnBy constructing a theoretical model, this paper analyzes the relationship between external governance environment, the proportion of the controlling shareholder's shareholding and current assets expropriation. In addition, we analyze the relationship between corporate investment, rate of return on investment and current assets expropriation. Based on theoretical analysis, we conduct an empirical study on several research hypotheses by using the company data listed from 1999 to 2005.rnTheoretical analysis shows that if current assets expropriation has no effect on corporate optimal investment decision, external governance environment and the proportion of the controlling shareholder's shareholding will restrain the motive for expropriating current assets for self-interest. If current assets expropriation has some effect on corporate optimal investment decision, the level and return of corporate investment can also restrain the motive for expropriating current assets for self-interest. At this time, current assets expropriation may lead to inefficient investment behavior. An empirical study suggests that current assets expropriation has significantly negative correlation with the level of corporate investment, the return of fixed assets investment and the proportion of the controlling shareholder shareholding. The external governance environment shows a positive correlation, but the regression result is not significant.rnIn this paper, theoretical analysis and empirical test results show that the controlling shareholder has different preferences for asset allocation in order to gain self-interest. It also shows that there is a relationship between current assets expropriation and corporate investment. Whether the controlling shareholder prefers current assets expropriation to corporate investment also depends on internal and external governance environment. This paper offers a new perspective for the controlling shareholder's expropriation research and contributes to future study.