一类特殊变异煤矿安全监察行为进化博弈分析

摘要

By evolutionary game theory, the model for colliery safe supervision with optimal probability of bribery is set up to analyse the stable status of supervision. The result shows that stable status is mainly related to the cost of executing colliery safe supervision and the sums of penalty during executing supervision, probability of leader's supervision, and the lost of un-implementing supervision function. Bribery sum is from coal enterprise. The influence on stable point affected by aforesaid parameters is given.%运用进化博弈理论建立了最优受贿概率时的煤矿安全监察行为进化博弈模型,对该条件下煤矿安全监察行为的稳定状态进行了分析.研究表明:最优受贿概率条件下的监察人员监察行为稳定状态主要与监察人员接受贿赂金额、认真执行监察职能获得的激励、不认真执行监察职能节约的成本、上级领导监督概率、不执行监察职能所受处罚相关.最后,对最优受贿概率条件下稳定状态受相关参数的影响进行了分析.