控股股东'掏空'与'支持':企业所得税的影响

摘要

Due to corporate income tax claim on cash flows, state is de facto the largest minority shareholder in almost all companies. This study incorporates corporate income tax into the analysis framework regarding the relationship between controlling shareholders and other minority shareholders, and seeks to investigate the impact of corporate income tax on the tunneling or propping behavior of controlling shareholders. The results suggest that the corporate income tax have two effects on the choice of tunneling or propping, the first one is that corporate tax rate would increase the propensity to choose tunneling rather than propping; the other one is that tax enforcement would decrease the propensity to choose tunneling. When the controlling shareholders intend to tunnel resources, the degree of tunneling increases with the rise of the tax rate and the decrease of the tax enforcement level. When the controlling shareholders intend to prop the firm, the degree of propping increases with the rise of the tax rate and the increase of the tax enforcement level. This paper not only provides new evidence on the determinants of tunneling and propping, but also enriches the literature on tax and agency problem.%源于企业所得税的征收, 国家某种意义上是公司最大的"小股东".本文将"国家股东"纳入控股股东与小股东间博弈行为的分析框架, 检验企业所得税征收对控股股东"掏空"与"支持"的影响.结果表明, 在"掏空"与"支持"的选择上, 企业所得税会产生两方面效应:税率提高会增强控股股东"掏空"的倾向;而税收征管则能够抑制其"掏空"的倾向.区分"掏空"与"支持"两类情形, 当控股股东试图"掏空"时, 税率越高, 税收征管强度越低, "掏空"程度越高;当控股股东试图"支持"时, 税率越高, 税收征管强度越高, "支持"程度越高.本文不仅提供了"掏空"与"支持"影响因素方面新的经验证据, 且丰富了税与代理问题相关的学术文献.