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人民币汇率中美博弈:一个纳什均衡模型分析

         

摘要

After the global financial turmoil, RMB exchange rate has increasingly becoming a new strategic areas of competition, contention and gaming between China and U.S..This paper applies the infinitely repeatedly complete information game model to investigate Sino-U.S. exchange rate issues, and we conclude that Sino-US exchange rate game belongs to sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium result depends on each party' s patience. More favorable equilibrium result is inclined to the party who has the greater patient coefficient, Therefore, faced by the RMB revaluation proposed by the U.S., China should insist on the principles of exchange rate adjustment according to our situation and wage a war on a long-term basis, besides,actively participate in international monetary system reform and improve our rights of financial discourse.%后危机时代人民币汇率日益成为中美两国竞争、争夺与博弈的战略性领域之一。本文通过构建一个中美汇率交锋的完全信息且无限次重复博弈模型,认为人民币汇率中美博弈属于子博弈精炼纳什均衡,均衡汇率水平取决于中美双方各自耐心系数的大小。谁的耐心系数大,最终的均衡汇率就对谁有利。因此,面对美国抛出的人民币升值论调,中国除了积极参与国际货币体系改革、提高金融话语权以外,还应坚持“汇率调整以我为主”的原则。

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