首页> 中文期刊> 《土木工程与管理学报》 >基于动态博弈的垃圾焚烧发电BOT项目特许权期决策模型

基于动态博弈的垃圾焚烧发电BOT项目特许权期决策模型

         

摘要

垃圾焚烧发电这类环境效益要优先于经济效益的环保BOT项目,从政府的角度期望项目公司投入更多的建设成本,保证项目质量,降低焚烧运营处理费用,延长项目的全寿命周期,带来更多的环境效益和社会福利.本文分析了建设成本与特许期长短的关系,提出了垃圾焚烧BOT项目经济寿命周期的概念及决策方法,引入环境效益来决策项目的全寿命周期,运用博弈理论建立了项目公司与政府的特许权期动态博弈模型,得到了政府特许权期决策与项目公司建设成本投入的精炼纳什均衡,并用算例进行分析,为政府决策垃圾焚烧BOT项目的特许权期、经济寿命周期、全寿命周期提供了理论依据和方法.%BOT Projects of waste incineration and generation have more environmental benefits than economic benefits. The government would hope the concessionaire company to put in more initial cost, which ensures the quality of the project, reduces the cost of operation, extends the life cycle and as a result brings more social benefits and environmental benefits. This article analyzes the relationship between initial cost and the length of concession period, and then proposes the concept of " economic life period of waste incineration BOT project" and proposes a method how to determine it. Game theory is used to establish the game model between Concessionaire Company and government. The analysis leads to a perfect Nash equilibrium between the concession decision-making of government and the initial cost of the Concessionaire Company. Finally the conclusion is explained by an example. The study provides theoretical basis and methods for Government to decide the concession period, the economic life period and the life cycle of waste incineration and generation BOT project

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