流动人口医保关系转移接续的对策研究--基于“囚徒困境”理论

摘要

The results of game analysis on the mutual recognition of payment period in inflow and outflow place showed that: there exists“prisoner's dilemma”in both single and repeated game, reflecting difficult mutual recognition of payment period in both inflow and outflow place. To break the“prisoner's dilemma”, it is necessary to reasonably estimate the cost of transfer and continuation of medical insurance relationship, accelerate the progress of the overall plan level of medical insurance, improve“the fixed number of years for premium”policy and strive for the realization of the unity of medical insurance information and technology on the basis of improving the policies and regulations of medical insurance.%人口流入地和流出地在医保缴费年限“互认”决策中的博弈分析显示：在单次博弈和重复博弈中均出现“囚徒困境”，即流动人口医保关系的缴费年限在流入地和流出地均难以实现互认。为破解这个“囚徒困境”，提出对策建议：在健全医疗保险政策法规的基础上，合理测算医保关系转移接续的成本，加快提高医保统筹层次的进度，完善医保缴费年限政策，并争取实现医保信息技术的统一。