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基于博弈论的食品安全监管制度激励相容研究

     

摘要

我国食品安全问题频发,食品安全监管工作不容乐观。设立食品安全监管制度和奖惩措施,形成激励相容机制,提高政府监管部门的工作效率、有效约束和监控食品安全监管利益链上各利益主体间的机会主义行为是食品安全监管有效的保证。指明激励相容制度的内涵,分析我国食品安全管理现状,建立博弈模型,阐明食品安全监管激励约束缺失的主要因素,并提出改善措施。%In recent years,emergency food safety issues frequently occur in China. China's food safety regulation work is hard to be satisfied. Establish the food safety regulatory system and incentive measures ,improve the efficiency of government regulation work,as well as effectively monitor and constraint the opportunistic behaviors of various stakeholders in the chain of food safety regulation can ensure the outcome of the food safety regulation. This paper points out that the meaning of incentive compatibility system,establishes the game model,analyzes the present situation of China's food safety regulation,and clarifies the main factors of the lack in food safety incentive,then puts forward the improvement measures.

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