基于斯塔克伯格博弈的联合中继和干扰的功率分配机制

摘要

In the wireless communications system,the cooperation of users with eavesdropping relay may result in the leakage of information.To ensure their communication security,it's necessary to pay the cooperative jammer for the jamming power.In order to improve the user benefits under secret communication,this paper presents a power allocation mechanism combining relay with jammer based on the Stackelberg game.In the case of the eavesdropping relay cooperative forwarding and the idle user collaborated interfering,a tripartite game model is established based on Stackelberg game,where the communication user is regarded as a power-buyer and the relay and idle users are regarded as power-sellers.Simulation results show that the proposed joint power allocation mechanism will converge to some value which is not only the maximum utility of all nodes after several iterations,but also the maximum security capacity of the sender.The security capacity improves by 0.2 (bit · s-t) · Hz-1 than that of relay with full power,which improves the safety performance of the user.%在无线通信系统中,用户与窃听中继协作将导致信息泄露,为保证自身通信安全需向协作干扰者支付报酬购买干扰功率,导致自身效益降低.为了在安全通信的同时提高用户效益,提出一种基于斯塔克伯格的联合中继和干扰的功率分配机制.在窃听中继协作转发、空闲用户协作干扰的场景下,建立三方博弈的斯塔克伯格博弈模型:将通信用户建模为功率购买者,窃听中继和空闲用户建模为功率出售者,有效刻画了安全与效益的折中关系.仿真结果表明,所提联合功率分配方案会在数次迭代后收敛到所有节点收益最大值,同时也是发送方通信安全容量的最大值,比中继全功率发送时提高了0.2 (bit·s-1)·Hz-1,提高用户安全性能.