地方官员激励、制度环境与要素市场扭曲*--基于中国省级面板数据的实证研究

摘要

It is the premise to govern the China�factor market distortions that exploring the internal reasons of the local officials�intervening in factors market.The motivation which local officials have inter-vened on the factor market may come from financial incentive,promotion incentive and rent-seeking incen-tive. Based on the existing literature,this paper theoretically discusses the mechanism of local officials�in-centive affecting on factors market distortion. It tests the theoretical hypothesis,using the China�s provin-cial panel data. The results show that the fiscal incentives,promotion incentives and rent seeking incen-tives have significant effects on the factors market distortion. In different institutional environment,the effects of local officials�incentive on the factor market distortion are different. Moreover,the improvement of financial and legal environment as well as clear property right can avoid the effect of local officials�in-centive on the factor market distortion in a certain extent. This paper not only expands the research field of officials�incentive and factor market distortion,but also inspires the direction of governing the factor mar-ket distortion.%探寻地方官员干预要素市场的动因是治理中国要素市场扭曲的前提，而地方官员对要素市场的干预可能主要源于财政、晋升和寻租等方面的激励。本文基于对现有文献的梳理和归纳，理论上分析了地方官员激励影响要素市场扭曲的机理，并利用中国省级层面面板数据对理论假说加以检验。研究发现：地方官员的财政激励、晋升激励和寻租激励对地区要素市场都产生了显著的扭曲效应，而“入世”后的这种扭曲效应下降了。在不同制度环境中，地方官员激励对要素市场扭曲的影响存在着差异。金融和法律环境的改善以及产权明晰程度的提高，能够在一定程度上规避地方官员激励对要素市场产生的扭曲效应。本文既拓展了官员激励和要素市场扭曲等研究领域，又启发了中国要素市场扭曲的治理方向。