智能卡芯片中TDES密码电路的差分功耗攻击

摘要

This paper used the correlation analysis method, and firstly conducted a successful DPA attacks on TDES hardware implementation. Experimental results show that for the simple power consumption models, correlation attacks provide good results and are extremely easy to manipulate. With the Hamming distance model, the lowest number of traces needed to successfully reveal the each round key is approximately 3 500 power traces. Meanwhile, the DPA attacks on TDES and DES are same because of their same implementation structure.%使用相关性分析方法进行差分功耗攻击(DPA)实验,成功攻击了TDES密码算法.结果表明,相关性分析方法对简单的功耗模型具有很好的攻击效果且实施简单,对于HD功耗模型,获得TDES每一轮的圈密钥所需最少曲线条数仅为3 500条；同时,由于TDES和DES电路的实现结构相同,对两者进行DPA攻击的方法相同.