Local Government Implicit Guarantees in China's Farmland Financial System

摘要

With the massive and intensive development of the operation mode of rural land in China,the financing problem of the new rural land managers has gradually attracted more attention.The reasonable design of farmland financial system is of great importance to promote rural financial resource allocation optimization.This paper chooses two types of measures of local government implicit guarantees which are commonly used in promoting rural land mortgage loan.The measures are establishing guarantee mechanism to provide guaranties to borrowers and purchasing debt assets from financial institutions.The analysis framework is based on the financing ability theory of Holmstrom &Tirole.Research shows that when considering the collateral disposal cost,the two measures both could contribute to expand the coverage of farmland financial service.Meanwhile,local government implicit guarantees also exists some negative effects.The suggestions of the paper are reducing the collateral disposal costs of farmland loan /encouraging the market-oriented guarantee institutions to enter the rural credit market further standardizing the operation of policy guarantee mechanism and making the use range of risk fund and disposal fund clear.