The supplicant superpower: Reexamining the Soviet-Egyptian relationship from 1965 to 1975.

摘要

From 1965-1975, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship was the cornerstone of Moscow's policy in the Middle East. The Kremlin's alignment with the epicenter of the Arab world permitted the articulation of military, political and economic objectives designed to enhance its own power and prestige, while erode that of the United States. This research demonstrates that the Moscow-Cairo nexus was of greater scope than hitherto recognized by the scholarly community. Certainly, political and military acrimony between the Arabs and the Israelis provided the Kremlin a timely entree into regional affairs. Yet, to frame Soviet-Egyptian relations by this variable has limited both our understanding of and the benefits accrued to Moscow from its relationship with Cairo. Ultimately, the scholarly community views the Soviet Union under Brezhnev as a conservative and status-quo global actor infected with gerontocratic malaise. This thesis reveals that the Brezhnevian Politburo was far from conservative rather, it was opportunistic and aggressive.