On Liberal Grounds: Judith N. Shklar on Politics, Morals and Human Dignity.

摘要

'Political liberalism' is a concept within political philosophy that has gained much traction since the late 20th century, but it generally fails to address adequately the moral and political grounding of liberal societies. John Rawls is usually the central figure affiliated with this concept; however, the work of Judith Shklar is a valuable and underappreciated resource in considering political liberalism.;Shklar's work often is classified as political liberalism in the sense that she distinguishes questions of politics from those of ethics, religion or philosophy. Shklar differs, though, from other political liberals in her skepticism that an overlapping consensus regarding justice ever can be achieved. Her unique assertion that injustice and vice, rather than justice and virtue, must be the primary focal points of liberal theory is both illuminating and perplexing. Instead of a summum bonum, Shklar holds that the only moral basis upon which liberalism can draw is the presence of a summum malum: cruelty. She does not view the pursuit of positive ends as liberalism's main objectives. Thus liberalism, for Shklar, cannot be based on a foundation beyond its negative, or restraining, capacities.;Through a close analysis of the broad spectrum of her writings, this study argues that Shklar's primary moral dictum on the avoidance of cruelty is not the sole moral grounding of her 'liberalism of fear'---and that adopting the viewpoint of Shklar's 'liberalism of permanent minorities' is a way to conceptualize this assertion. Human dignity underpins and elevates her summum malum to its place within her liberal perspective. The implications of this argument extend into the broader relationship between dignity and political liberalism, suggesting that a foundation of human dignity in fact provides for and sustains a politically liberal public order.