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Imagining the Fed: Central bank structure and United States monetary governance (1913-1968).

机译:想象美联储:中央银行结构和美国货币治理(1913-1968年)。

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摘要

This dissertation analyzes the institutional development and policy performance of the Federal Reserve System from 1913-1968. Whereas existing scholarship assumes Federal Reserve institutions have remained static since 1913, this project demonstrates that the Federal Reserve was a site of extensive institutional experimentation across its first half century of operations. The 1913 Federal Reserve Act created thirteen autonomous agencies without offering guidance regarding how these units should function as a coherent system. The extent to which this institutional jumble congealed into a central bank-like organization has fluctuated over time. Institutional changes were driven by external shocks and shaped by an ongoing internal debate about normative systemic governance. Some agents called for greater institutional centralization to increase the system's strategic capacity. Others drew upon shared liberal ideals to defend the system's decentralized governance traditions. These debates resulted in frequent reconstitutions of the policy-making regime. This dissertation argues the Fed's temporally-specific institutional configurations were consequential for United States monetary and exchange rate policies. During periods of relatively centralized Federal Reserve governance, internationally-oriented agents wielded control over the system's policy-making levers to help stabilize the dollar's exchange rate. During periods of institutional fragmentation, by contrast, monetary policies grew increasingly rigid, promoting dollar instability. Consequently, the structure of American central banking institutions has important implications for both the domestic and international political economies. This project suggests that insights from the positive study of institutions should be applied to the design of central banking institutions. Although institutional fragmentation can check arbitrary power, it likewise can paralyze the policy-making process and undermine the formation and steady pursuit of long-term strategic goals.
机译:本文分析了1913-1968年美联储制度的制度发展和政策绩效。现有的奖学金假定美联储的机构自1913年以来一直保持不变,但该项目表明,美联储在其运营的前半个世纪一直是广泛的机构试验场所。 1913年的《联邦储备法》建立了13个自治机构,但未提供有关这些部门应如何发挥协调系统作用的指导。随着时间的流逝,这种机构混乱变成了类似中央银行的组织的程度在波动。制度变革是由外部冲击驱动的,并由内部对规范性系统治理的持续辩论所形成。一些特工呼吁加强机构集权,以提高该系统的战略能力。其他人则利用共同的自由主义理想来捍卫该系统的分散式治理传统。这些辩论导致决策体制的频繁重组。本文认为,美联储在时间上特定的制度配置对美国的货币和汇率政策具有重要意义。在相对集中的美联储治理期间,面向国际的代理商对系统的政策制定杠杆进行了控制,以帮助稳定美元的汇率。相比之下,在机构分散的时期,货币政策变得越来越僵化,加剧了美元的不稳定。因此,美国中央银行机构的结构对国内外政治经济都具有重要意义。该项目建议将对机构的积极研究得出的见解应用于中央银行机构的设计。尽管机构分裂可以控制任意权力,但它同样可以使决策过程瘫痪,破坏长期战略目标的形成和稳定追求。

著录项

  • 作者

    Thompson, Nicolas Wayne.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Oregon.;

  • 授予单位 University of Oregon.;
  • 学科 Political science.;Public policy.;Economic history.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2015
  • 页码 270 p.
  • 总页数 270
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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