Examination of Electric Utility CEO Compensation 2000-2011 and its significance to Company Earnings, Company Revenue, Company Stock and the Dow Jones Utility Average.

摘要

This dissertation examined electric utility CEO compensation during the years 2000 through 2011 for United States owned and operated companies. To determine the extent to which agency theory may apply to electric utility CEO compensation, this examination segmented the industry by four types of company financial metrics: revenue, earnings, stock price and the Dow Jones Utility Average; by five categories of CEO compensation: base salary, bonus, stock grants, all other compensation and total compensation; and by four categories of company size as measured by revenue: large, medium, small and the industry as a whole. Electric utility CEO compensation data was analyzed with the financial metrics to determine correlations. No type of compensation was highly correlated to any of the financial metrics for any size industry segment indicating that there was little agency. CEO compensation in large electric utility companies was higher than compensation in medium and smaller companies even though the CEOs at larger companies earned less per dollar of revenue and per dollar of earnings than their counterparts in smaller companies.