CLAN GOVERNANCE AND COLLECTIVE GOODS: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITIES (PRISONERS DILEMMA, COMMUNITY STRUCTURE, SOCIAL EXCHANGE, ELITE NETWORKS).

摘要

This study furthers Ouchi's work on the clan mode of transaction governance by applying it to the production of community collective goods. Clans are governance mechanisms which rely on value commonality and social incentives to encourage members in collective goods provision processes. Voluntary associations function as clan governance mechanisms in the production of community collective goods. Since the community contexts entail cost-bearing properties, certain communities are more conducive to voluntary association activity. Four types of collective goods (corporate and non-corporate philanthropy, voting, and honesty), voluntary associations (business, labor, civic-social, and religious), and contextual conditions (industrial and political homogeneity, resource scarcity, and population stability) are identified. One hundred and fifty of the 152 largest counties in the United States are studied. Collective goods are regressed on the four types of voluntary association activity which are, in turn, regressed on contextual conditions. Results indicate that collective goods which are subject to high non-exclusion (voting and honesty) are associated with voluntary associations which rely primarily on value commonality (religious). Religious associations are, in turn, associated with population stability which is required for the creation of common values. Corporate and non-corporate philanthropy are less subject to non-exclusion and are associated with business, labor, and civic-social associations. These associations tend to rely on social incentives to encourage cooperative behavior and are associated with the contextual conditions of industrial homogeneity and resource scarcity. The results confirm that associations which rely primarily on common values can be distinguished from those which rely on social incentives. This resembles Durkheim's distinction between organic and mechanical solidarity from which Ouchi initially adopted the clan construct. This ex post explanation is examined through the application of path analysis. Industrial homogeneity has both direct and indirect effects on more exclusive collective goods with the indirect effect occurring through organic solidarity. In contrast resource scarcity has solely an indirect effect. Population stability has an indirect effect on less exclusive collective goods through mechanical solidarity. Socio-economic status has only a direct effect on less exclusive collective goods.