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ESSAYS ON THE CORPORATE TAX POLICY EFFECTS ON INVESTMENT AND FINANCING CHOICES (TAX POLICY, ABANDONMENT, ACCOUNTING).

机译:关于企业税收政策对投资和融资选择的影响(税收政策,遗弃,会计)。

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摘要

In this thesis, I examine tax policy effects on firms' investment and financing decisions and on social welfare. In the first essay (Chapter 2), I examine the tax bias in favor of debt financing. Contrary to the traditional view, this policy could encourage firms to choose less risky projects. If so, such a policy would increase social welfare, because it helps solve a principal-agent problem between firms and their non-owner shareholders--customers, suppliers, employees, and government.; In the second essay (Chapter 3), I examine abandonment tax provisions. Firms can obtain a net present value tax savings, because they are allowed to accelerate scheduled deductions to the year of abandonment. This option encourages firms to make risk, time horizon, and capital structure decisions in a manner that differs from conventional thinking and previous findings.; In the third essay (Chapter 4), I examine why a firm would choose a seemingly unfavorable accounting procedure, such as FIFO instead of LIFO and straight-line instead of accelerated depreciation. My theory is that such choices help to align manager and shareholder interests and that this mechanism is most important when managers have an informational advantage over shareholders. I present empirical evidence that shows a link between the magnitude of information asymmetry and the choice of a seemingly unfavorable accounting procedure.
机译:在本文中,我研究了税收政策对企业投资和融资决策以及社会福利的影响。在第一篇文章(第2章)中,我研究了有利于债务融资的税收偏向。与传统观点相反,该政策可以鼓励企业选择风险较小的项目。如果是这样的话,这样的政策将增加社会福利,因为它有助于解决企业与非所有者股东(客户,供应商,雇员和政府)之间的委托代理问题。在第二篇文章(第3章)中,我研究了遗弃税规定。公司可以获得净现值节税,因为它们可以将排定的扣除额加速到放弃之年。这种选择鼓励公司以不同于传统思维和先前发现的方式做出风险,时间跨度和资本结构决策。在第三篇文章(第4章)中,我研究了为什么一家公司会选择一种看似不利的会计程序,例如使用FIFO代替LIFO,使用FIFO而不是加速折旧。我的理论是,这样的选择有助于使经理和股东的利益保持一致,并且这种机制在经理比股东具有信息优势时最为重要。我提供的经验证据表明,信息不对称的程度与看似不利的会计程序的选择之间存在联系。

著录项

  • 作者

    LANDER, JOEL MARTIN.;

  • 作者单位

    UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES.;

  • 授予单位 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES.;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.; Business Administration Accounting.; Economics Theory.
  • 学位 PH.D.
  • 年度 1990
  • 页码 136 p.
  • 总页数 136
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财政、金融;财务管理、经济核算;经济学;
  • 关键词

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