Negotiating the 1973 Paris Peace Accords: A case study in conflict termination.

摘要

The purpose of this study is to provide a critical analysis of the Paris Peace Talks and the dynamics that led to the settlement of the Paris Peace Accords. Two hypotheses will be put forward and addressed: Only a fundamental shift in the negotiating position of Hanoi by October of 1972 allowed the Paris Peace Talks to be eventually settled in January of 1973, and second, the Nixon administration was compelled to accept a settlement because of strong domestic anti-war sentiment, especially in the Congress and business community.;Three dominant themes can be found in the theoretical literature on conflict resolution. These themes, military stalemate/military reversal, the threat of domestic instability, and the international balance of power, are directly applicable to the Paris Peace Talks.;These vital issues will be addressed by applying the analytical framework to four "historical snapshots." These four snapshots have been isolated because their influence on the Paris Peace Talks was vital. The four snapshots are as follows: the Communist Tet Offensive, the decision made by President Johnson to begin deescalation of the war by entering into peace talks in March of 1968, the American and South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia and Laos in April of 1970 and February of 1971, respectively, and the North Vietnamese Nguyen Hue Offensive of March of 1972. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)