A critique of David Griffin's process thought as an antifoundationalist postmodern philosophy (Whitehead).

摘要

This thesis critically engages David Ray Griffin's process philosophy as a promising postmodern philosophy. Chapter two showed that common to postmodernists is the rejection of context-independent means to judge conflicting views of rationality. Such "classical" foundationalism is one of the main weaknesses of modernism and is rejected by most, if not all, postmodernists.; Chapter three aimed at showing that Griffin's constructive postmodernism suffers from a foundational component, which involves "hard-core common sense notions." With his insistence that these notions function as ahistorical, non-culturally conditioned ways to adjudicate competing claims and prevent relativism, Griffin resorts to a foundationalist model of epistemology.; Chapter four maintained that a corrective to Griffin's problem could be found in the thought of Whitehead as interpreted by Frank Burch Brown. With Whitehead's emphasis on the nature of poetic language and the tentative nature of metaphysical speculation, a corrective to Griffin's foundational language exists.