Political innovation and political survival: Coalition politics, free democrats, and Germany's centrist foreign policy, 1969-1990.

摘要

The political dynamics of multiparty governments are traditionally associated with generating governmental instability, ideological polarization, and political weakness, resulting in foreign policy incoherence and paralysis. Why then did successive German governments promote a coherently reformist and activist foreign policy agenda? Most observers explain the moderate and multilateral tone of German foreign policy with systemic pressures or public opinion. This study accounts for the foreign policy effect of coalition politics.;The research design was inspired by Robert Putnam's "two-level games" approach and Wolfram Hanrieder's "compatibility and consensus" concept. Concentrating on the years between 1969 and 1990, the study investigates three aspects of German foreign policy: The consistency with which German coalition governments pursued foreign policy goals; their commitment to international cooperation and multilateralism; and the effects of coalition politics on Germany's international bargaining position. The investigation is limited to historical instances that fulfill two conditions: (1) Polarization of the domestic debate on foreign policy issues; and (2) paralysis in Germany's decision-making process.;The study finds that the dynamics of German coalition politics had several effects: First, they supported a cooperative and multilateral pursuit of foreign policy goals. Second, they assisted the two main parties (SPD and CDU/CSU) in adjusting to the exigencies of the densely interdependent environment within which German foreign policy has to be conducted. Third, they helped to moderated foreign policy extremism voiced within the SPD and CDU/CSU. Fourth, if a "third" party aspired to gain and maintain a power-political position as a junior coalition party, it had to successfully pursue both political centrism and pragmatism.;Taken together these points suggest that the dynamics of coalition politics may equip a political system with both enhanced international bargaining power and the ability to pursue a reformist and activist foreign policy. This finding is counter-intuitive and discredits the thesis that multiparty government must lead to paralysis and indecision.