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A chronic political illness: An analysis of corruption and anti-corruption in contemporary China.

机译:慢性政治疾病:当代中国腐败与反腐败的分析。

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摘要

This study highlights structural and cultural approaches. It argues that corruption in modern times is partially derived from the long history of imperial China characterized by absolute bureaucratic powers and widespread power abuses. Traditional norms and value system, which may exert stable and lasting influence on human behaviour, are able to induce official corruption even in the socialist conditions, without regard to frequent replacements of different regimes or any institutional changes.; It is also shown that official corruption in communist China is rooted in the defects inherent in its political and economic structures. The potential incidence and the persistence of certain patterns of official corruption might have been predetermined by these institutional or systemic factors. While the public ownership of means of production and the central planning system have predestined the bureaucracy's overmanagement of the economy and society and vested Party officials with too much discretionary power, economic reform as well as a series of other unsophisticated reform policies, on the other hand, have further intensified this power overconcentration and stimulated the geneses and spread of certain malpractices. Moreover, the lack of a powerful and independent supervisory mechanism, both internal and external, is also conducive to corruption. There is no political opposition, nor is there independent legislation and media in a real sense in today's China. The judiciary and the internal supervisory systems are also problematic and short of the necessary authority and independence. Given these systems' vulnerability to power intervention and the institutional defects inherent in the political structure, it appears inevitable that public power without necessary systemic restraint and supervision would increase the incidence of corruption. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
机译:这项研究突出了结构和文化方法。它认为,现代的腐败部分源于帝国主义中国的悠久历史,其特征是绝对的官僚权力和广泛的权力滥用。传统的规范和价值体系可能对人类的行为产生稳定和持久的影响,即使在社会主义条件下,也能够诱发官方腐败,而无需考虑频繁更换不同的政权或进行任何体制上的改变。还表明,共产主义中国的官方腐败根源于其政治和经济结构的固有缺陷。这些机构或系统因素可能已经预先确定了某些形式的官方腐败的潜在发生率和持续性。另一方面,生产资料的公共所有权和中央计划系统注定了官僚主义对经济和社会的过度管理,并赋予了党员过多的自由裁量权,而经济改革以及一系列其他不老练的改革政策,进一步加剧了这种权力过分集中,并刺激了某些渎职行为的产生和蔓延。而且,缺乏内部和外部的强大而独立的监督机制,也有利于腐败。在当今的中国,没有政治上的反对,也没有真正意义上的独立立法和媒体。司法和内部监督系统也存在问题,缺乏必要的权威和独立性。鉴于这些系统容易受到权力干预,并且政治结构固有的体制缺陷,似乎不可避免的是,没有必要的系统约束和监督的公共权力会增加腐败的发生率。 (摘要由UMI缩短。)

著录项

  • 作者

    Sun, Yunbo.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Manitoba (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 University of Manitoba (Canada).;
  • 学科 Political Science Public Administration.; Political Science General.; History Asia Australia and Oceania.
  • 学位 M.P.A.
  • 年度 1997
  • 页码 178 p.
  • 总页数 178
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;政治理论;世界史;
  • 关键词

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