Morality and justice as restricted benevolence.

摘要

In this dissertation I develop a unique virtue ethical approach to morality. Whereas most contemporary philosophers who are attracted to virtue ethics write about traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics, I develop a version in the tradition of the British moral sentimentalists. This approach, known as agent-based virtue ethics, differs from standard virtue ethical accounts in that it does not base ethical evaluations on character traits, the possession of which are necessary for eudaimonia. Rather, agent-based virtue ethics dictates that an act's moral evaluation is entirely determined by the motives of the agent performing the act. An act that expresses a virtuous motive(s) is morally right. I call my approach Morality as Restricted Benevolence, because the only motive or virtue I utilize is benevolence. However, whereas benevolence is typically considered to be one motive, I conclude that there are four different types of benevolence: (1) the desire to help those in need (compassion, the desire to protect people from being hurt or harmed, and the desire to help those who are dependent), (2) the desire to stand on one's own two feet (non-parasitism), (3) gratitude and (4) sheer benevolence, which covers benevolent acts that do not fall into first three categories. I conclude that acts motivated by either of the first three take priority over those motivated by sheer benevolence, all things being equal. After constructing my theory, I attempt to demonstrate that it yields ethical judgments that substantially conform to our common-sense moral intuitions in cases concerning the distribution of benefits and burdens and cases concerning rules such as "one ought not lie." Hence, morality as restricted benevolence is a promising alternative to Kantian and utilitarian approaches to morality.; In the second half of my dissertation, I apply my ethical theory to the law. I argue that a just law, like a moral act, is one that expresses one of the four restricted forms of benevolence. Since it may seem strange to claim that a law can express benevolence, I attempt to make sense of this claim. I conclude by applying my theory to the issue of punishment.