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What we should treat as an end in itself.

机译:我们应将其本身视为目的。

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Much of the scholarship on Kant's ethics in recent years has been an effort to debunk the view of Kant as a stuffy, overly demanding moralist with an unrealistic view of human psychology and the limits of human virtue. Although this strategy has produced some excellent commentary, I argue that the strategy has been carried too far when applied to "humanity as an end in itself" formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Commentators have taken great pains to emphasize that this "humanity," which must be treated as an end in itself, is some trait that every minimally rational human being necessarily possesses (such the power to set ends for oneself or the mere capacity to act morally).;Against these minimal readings of "humanity," I argue that the main ideas of Kant's ethics, as well as particular textual passages, dictate that we must take humanity to be equivalent to a good will, a commitment to do what duty requires no matter the cost to oneself. And, contrary to first appearances, this reading does not make Kant's ethics implausible or morally repugnant. This is both because a good will, properly understood, is not so rare among humans, and because there are reasons to treat most humans with respect and concern, even if they do not fully earn this treatment by possessing a good will.;Having argued for reading "humanity" as "good will," I bring this reading to bear on three controversies involving the humanity formulation. The first is that a satisfactory argument for, or "derivation" of, the humanity formulation has long been elusive. The second problem is a challenge posed recently, that Kant's ethics is best seen as consequentialist, because Kant's notion of the special value of humanity leads inevitably to consequentialist normative principles. Finally, I argue against a charge made by defenders of animal rights, that it is arbitrary to exclude non-rational beings from the same full moral consideration that rational beings deserve. By showing that my good will reading is helpful in resolving these three controversial issues, I show that my reading is fruitful as well as textually justified.
机译:近年来,许多关于康德伦理学的研究都是为了揭露康德的观点,认为康德是一个闷闷不乐,对道德要求过高的道德主义者,对人类心理学和人类道德的局限性不切实际。尽管该策略产生了一些出色的评论,但我认为该策略在应用于“绝对必要性”的“以人为本”的表述时已走得太远。评论员竭尽全力强调,这种“人性”本身必须被视为目的,是每个最低限度理性人都必须具备的某些特征(例如为自己定下目的的能力或仅具有道德行为的能力) ).;在对“人性”的这些最低限度的解读中,我认为康德伦理学的主要思想以及特定的文字段落规定,我们必须将人性等同于一种善意,即履行职责所需要的承诺不管自己付出什么代价。而且,与初次露面相反,这种阅读并不能使康德的道德观念令人难以置信或在道德上令人反感。这是因为良好的意愿在人类中并不罕见,并且因为有理由以尊重和关心的态度对待大多数人类,即使他们没有通过善意获得充分的治疗。为了将“人性”读作“善意”,我将这一读物用于涉及人性表述的三个争议。首先是,对人性表述的满意论证或“推导”长期以来难以捉摸。第二个问题是最近提出的一个挑战,即康德的伦理学最好被看作是结果论者,因为康德关于人的特殊价值的观念不可避免地导致了结果论者的规范性原则。最后,我反对动物权利捍卫者提出的指控,即将非理性存在排除在理性存在应有的完全道德考虑之外是任意的。通过表明我的善意阅读有助于解决这三个有争议的问题,我表明我的阅读既富有成果又经文本证明是正确的。

著录项

  • 作者

    Dean, Richard Curtis.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.;

  • 授予单位 The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1999
  • 页码 200 p.
  • 总页数 200
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 哲学理论;
  • 关键词

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